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ARGUMENT
The Magistrate Correctly Concluded That A Limited Detention Of Persons Present
During A Parole Search Is Reasonable Under The Fourth Amendment
A.

Introduction
As set forth in the Appellant’s brief, the magistrate correctly concluded that a brief,

relatively non-intrusive detention of persons present on the premises of a parole search is
constitutionally reasonable, and the district court erred by reversing. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 4-11.) Although neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Idaho appellate
courts have addressed the issue, courts that have addressed it have concluded that such
limited detentions are reasonable because justified by governmental interests in
administering its parole system. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6 (citing Sanchez v. Canales,
574 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King,
687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012); People v. Rios, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 105-06 (Cal. App. 5th
Cir. 2011); Harrison v. State, 444 S.E.2d 354, 355 (Ga. App. 1994))). In concluding
otherwise, the district court erroneously, and without authority, overstated the scope of the
intrusion and understated the governmental interests. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-11.)
Phipps presents two arguments in support of the district court’s conclusion. First,
she contends that she was not a resident of the apartment, that the prosecution conceded
this below, and that the state is presenting a new issue on appeal. (Respondent’s brief, pp.
4-6.) This argument miscomprehends the state’s argument, which is that the limited
detention of Phipps was reasonable regardless of whether she was or was not a resident,
and that the district court erred by applying an ad hoc rather than a bright-line standard.
Phipps next argues that the district court correctly concluded that a limited seizure of a
non-parolee in the course of a parole search is constitutionally unreasonable.
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(Respondent’s brief, pp. 7-15.) This argument is without merit; application of the proper
legal standards shows that a limited seizure of occupants of the residence to be searched is
constitutionally reasonable.

B.

The State Has Not Presented A “New Issue”
Phipps argues that the state is advancing a “new argument and theory aimed at the

reasonableness of detaining a resident of a home subject to the random or routine searches
of parole officers.”

(Respondent’s brief, p. 6.)

This argument is based on a

miscomprehension of the state’s argument and is without merit.
This Court “ha[s] long held that ‘[a]ppellate court review is limited to the evidence,
theories and arguments that were presented below.’” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho
271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170
P.3d 375, 379 (2007)). “[B]oth the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be
raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.” State v. Gonzalez,
No. 44534, slip op. at 6 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2019). Review of the record shows that the issue
presented by the state on appeal is entirely consistent with its argument below, and
therefore preserved.
On this appeal the state asserted, based on the testimony, that “[o]ne of the officers
recognized Phipps from previous visits as a resident of the apartment.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 6 (citing Tr., p. 12, Ls. 6-7; p. 19, Ls. 22-23; p. 22, Ls. 8-10).) In its brief to the district
court, the state specifically cited to and relied on evidence that “the Probation Officers were
familiar with Ms. Phipps as she had been present at the home during prior visits, so had a
more intimate relationship with the home than being simply a visitor.” (R., p. 57 (citing
Tr. p. 22, Ls. 3-9; p. 33, Ls. 14-21).) The district court specifically acknowledged that the
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parole officers “were familiar with Defendant from prior visits.” (R., p. 80.) The state has
consistently maintained that Phipps had a “relationship with the home” and was not
“simply a visitor.”
More importantly, the state’s legal argument is that the applicable standard is
categorical and not an ad hoc balancing test requiring proof of the party’s connection to
the residence or the search (indeed, the purpose of the detention is, in part, to ascertain such
things), and that the district court erred by applying an ad hoc standard. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 7-10.) The state relied on Phipps’ connection to the residence only as an “illustration.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) The applicable test allowed the detention of Phipps whether she
was a cohabitant of the parolee or a “hapless Amway salesman in the wrong place at the
wrong time.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) Not only is the state’s argument preserved and
consistent with its argument below, the main point of Phipps’ contention is irrelevant to
this appeal except as an illustration.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Phipps’ Detention Was
Unreasonable
Officers conducting a constitutional search of premises have a high interest in

controlling the movements and activities of persons on those premises, both for their own
protection and to preserve the integrity of the search. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
696-705 (1981). Thus, a limited detention of persons on the premises is constitutionally
reasonable. Id. “Summers recognized that a rule permitting the detention of occupants on
the premises during the execution of a search warrant, even absent individualized
suspicion, was reasonable and necessary in light of the law enforcement interests in
conducting a safe and efficient search.” Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 200 (2013).
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The interests in conducting a safe and efficient search also apply to searches conducted
pursuant to parole search authority, and therefore also make reasonable a similar detention.
Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012); Harrison v. State, 444 S.E.2d 354,
355 (Ga. App. 1994). See
also ---------People v. Rios, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 105-06 (Cal. App. 5th
- --Cir. 2011) (declining to adopt per se rule, court found detention pursuant to probation
search proper).
The district court acknowledged the state interest in conducting a “safe” search, and
thus held that detaining Phipps for purposes of a protective sweep of the residence was
proper. (R., p. 80.1) It discounted, however, the interest in conducting an efficient search
because parole searches are not conditioned upon a judicial finding of probable cause. (R.,
pp. 78-81 (addressing risk of flight and orderly completion of search).) Thus, the district
court concluded, once they were done securing the premises to be searched, the officers
were required to give Phipps the opportunity to leave. (R., p. 80.) Having failed to afford
her that opportunity, the detention beyond securing the premises was unreasonable. (R., p.
81.) In this the district court erred.

1

The district court is somewhat inconsistent in its analysis, at one point stating that “officer
safety dictates that officers should at least be allowed to identify new persons arriving and
remaining on the premises during a search” (R., p. 80) but also stating Phipps “was
unlawfully seized when law enforcement arrived to perform the residence check” (R., p.
81). The state assumes here that the district court misspoke as to this latter quote, because
law enforcement did not arrive on the scene until after the relevant time, and mere arrival
alone by law enforcement does not constitute a seizure. State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163,
167, 267 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2011) (“Only when an officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude that a
seizure has occurred.”).
4

First, no court has ever adopted a standard that requires officers to afford a person
the chance to leave in order to avoid a reasonable detention, or that holds that the failure to
offer the chance to leave renders a reasonable detention unreasonable. Applying such an
arbitrary standard is unworkable both for officers and for courts. Officers would be
restricting a person’s movements regardless of whether they detained that person on the
premises or demanded that the person leave. Giving the person the “choice” on what
restriction of liberty to endure is hardly a logical standard. That officers have a sufficient
interest when conducting a probation search to intrude on the liberty interest at all, as the
district court stated they had, demonstrates the reasonableness of the officers’ actions in
this case.
Second, the district court both overstated the scope of the intrusion and understated
the scope of the governmental interests. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-11.) The district court
concluded that it would be reasonable for officers conducting a parole search to restrict the
liberty of anyone present by either detaining them on the premises being searched or
insisting they leave the property altogether. However, merely giving them the choice of
what liberty restriction to endure (stay and be detained or leave) erroneously weighs the
interests involved. Once the district court recognized the need to detain persons for the
limited purpose of allowing parole officers to safely and effectively conduct their search
of the parolee’s residence, it should have applied the Supreme Court’s categorical rule
allowing limited detentions. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-11.)
Phipps argues that “the district court properly found that a warrant based on
probable cause establishes a nexus between the premises described in the warrant and its
occupants” and that “such nexus is not present where a search is based on consent via
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waiver as a condition of parole or probation.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 11. See R., pp. 7576.) The initial flaw in this reasoning is that there is no analysis based on a warrant
establishing a “nexus” between the premises and the occupants in Summers. Indeed, the
word “nexus” appears nowhere in the opinion. Summers, 452 U.S. 692. Phipps’ argument
is irrelevant.
The second flaw in Phipps’ argument is its assertion that a parole search is based
on consent when, to the contrary, it is reasonable under general Fourth Amendment
principles. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 n.3 (2006) (“[b]ecause we find that
the search at issue here is reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach, we
need not reach the issue whether “acceptance of the search condition constituted consent”).
Phipps is merely articulating an erroneous statement of the interests involved by
categorizing the search a consensual rather than a reasonable search to administer the
parole system.
The fatal flaw in both the district court’s analysis and Phipps’ argument is that they
rely on applying the factors articulated in Summers—risk of flight, safety threat posed to
the officers, and risk to efficacy of the search—as if these factors were a case-by-case
totality of the circumstances test applicable to the facts of the case. This approach has been
squarely and completely rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States. Summers,
452 U.S. at 705, n. 19 (Court not adopting an ad hoc balancing test requiring an officer to
“evaluate either the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to
be imposed by the seizure”); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (Summers
established that an “officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is categorical”). It
simply did not matter whether Phipps, under the facts of this case, was a flight risk, posed
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a safety threat to the officers, or endangered the efficacy of the search. The only legally
relevant question, which was not addressed by the district court or by Phipps, is whether
the governmental interest in conducting safe, efficient, and constitutional parole searches
justifies the limited intrusion of detaining occupants of the premises to be searched.
Because the governmental interests in parole searches and searches pursuant to warrants
are indistinguishable, and the privacy intrusion is identical, detaining Phipps for purposes
of conducting the parole search was reasonable.

CONCLUSION
The state requests this Court to reverse and vacate the district court’s intermediate
appellate opinion and reinstate the magistrate’s denial of suppression.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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